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INTRODUCTION 
When the verdict came down just after 10 o 'clock 
Tuesday morning, politicians canceled news conferences 
in Washington, President Clinton interrupted a meeting, 
stockbrokers stopped trading and long-distance phone 
calls dropped dramatically. Nearly all eyes turned to an 
image coming from a lone television camera mounted on 
the wall of a paneled courtroom in Downtown Los 
Angeles where the strange and disquieting case of the 
People vs. Orenthal J. Simpson was about to come to a 
resounding and startling conclusion. After less than four 
hours of deliberations, the jury dispatched the fruit of 133 
days of testimony and acquitted the football-star-turned-
actor in the murder of his former wife, Nicole Brown 
Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman. 1 
Amid the chaos outside the Los Angeles Criminal 
Courts Building on Tuesday, a small-boned, blond woman 
stood quietly at the curb, weeping behind dark glasses. 
The woman, Deborah Plewniak, explained that she could 
not stay put at her job after the verdict was read, that she 
had lived with an abusive husband for eight years and 
now counseled victims of domestic violence. "I don ~ 
understand," the 36-year-old woman said plaintively as a 
crush of celebrants swirled around her, rejoicing in a 
lightning verdict that set O.J. Simpson free. "I feel like we 
1. The Verdict Is In: A City Divided; The Simpson trial has raised questions of 
police propriety and racial antipathy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Bl. 
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are so unevolved. We need to deal with domestic violence 
in this country. "2 
On the other side of town, another woman of 
similar sentiment fought back tears. "I want to cry, but 
I'm holding it back, " said Kathryn Davis-Finch, an 
African American graduate student at Loyola Marymount 
University, who had come with her classmates to tour the 
Museum of Tolerance, a visit that was postponed after the 
verdict. "I am feeling so powerless, " continued Davis-
Finch, who is studying to be an art therapist. "This 
outcome speaks to our oppression. How do we get justice 
as women?" The laments of these two women echoed 
around Los Angeles and across America as victims of 
domestic violence and their advocates pondered the end 
of a trial that had brought a bonanza of attention to their 
cause but ended with stunning repudiation. 3 
Ms. Davis-Finch's question, "How do we get justice as women?," had 
been considered by Congress back in 1990 when Senator Joseph Biden 
submitted a report to the Senate proposing the Violence Against Women 
Act ("VAWA").4 To ensure justice for women, this Act created five 
Titles directed at safe streets for women, safe homes for women, civil 
rights for women, safe campuses for women, and equal justice for 
women in the courts.5 It took four years for the Act to become law, 
finally passing as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994.6 To combat violence against women, the VAWA 
provides two new weapons: a federal criminal action for interstate 
domestic violence7 and a civil rights cause of action for victims of 
crime motivated by gender.8 
On Tuesday, May 23, 1995, Christopher Bailey became the first man 
to be convicted under the new interstate domestic violence law.9 For 
2. Jane Gross & Sheryl Stolberg, The Simpson Verdicts; Activists Lament Verdict 
but Applaud Focus on Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al. 
3. Id. 
4. s. REP. No. 101-545, at I (1990). 
5. Id. 
6. Pub. L. No. I 03-322, 108 Stat. 1796 ( codified as scattered sections of 8, 18, 
and 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 
7. 18 u.s.c. § 2261 (1994). 
8. 42 u.s.c. § 13981 (1994). 
9. Grisly Beating Case Yields First Conviction Under New U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, 
May 24, 1995, at A20 [hereinafter Grisly Beating Case]. 
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beating his wife bloody and driving aimlessly across West Virginia and 
Kentucky for six days while she remained locked in the trunk, Mr. 
Bailey received the maximum twenty-year penalty.10 Had Bailey been 
prosecuted under West Virginia state laws, he would have faced only a 
malicious wounding charge that carries a maximum of ten years in 
prison. 11 This interstate domestic violence law has subsequently been 
challenged as unconstitutional. 12 
By 1995, only one case mentioned the civil rights action for victims 
of violent crime motivated by gender. 13 Unfortunately, the claim in 
that case was denied because the court found that the statute could not 
be applied retroactively.14 Such procedural dismissals will not prevent 
future attempts to rely on this new civil rights statute. In fact, a 1995 
suit has been initiated by Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia 
Polytechnic and State University, who was allegedly raped by two 
freshman football players. 15 Brzonkala filed an $8.3 million claim 
against the two students and the university for the deprivation of her 
civil rights by this crime against women and for sex discrimination by 
the university's handling of sexual assault complaints through its internal 
judicial process.16 
David Paxton, attorney for one of the alleged rapists, submitted a brief 
which argued that Congress exceeded its authority in passing the 
Violence Against Women Act, and that sexual abuse is not covered by 
the Constitution's Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 
In response to this, on March 27, 1996, the Justice Department 
announced that it would intervene in Christy Brzonkala's lawsuit to 
l 0. Man Convicted Under Domestic Violence Act Given Life Term, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 1995, at A4. 
11. Grisley Beating Case, supra note 9, at A20. 
12. See United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See infra 
Part X.A for a discussion of the Gluzman case. 
13. Doe v. Abbott Lab., 892 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1995). 
14. Id. 
15. Nina Bernstein, Rape at Root of Student's Federal Suit: Woman Claims School 
Protected Its Athletes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 1996, at All. See also 
Richard Jerome et al., No Justice, No Peace, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Mar. 11, 1996, at 42. 
16. Bernstein, supra note 15, at All. Ms. Brzonkala contended that "Virginia 
Tech subverted its confidential judicial process to put [her] at a disadvantage for the 
benefit of its male football team, in violation of Title IX laws that bar sex discrimination 
in schools accepting federal money." Id. 
17. Joe Davidson, U.S. to Defend Law on Violence Against Women, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 27, 1996, at B7. 
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defend the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act. 18 The 
Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office subsequently appeared 
as amicus curiae before the Western District of Virginia in support of 
Brzonkala's lawsuit.19 Other challenges have since been levied against 
the civil rights statute as well.20 
These federal criminal and civil rights causes of action would probably 
be unremarkable if not for the fact that in June 1995, the United States 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Lopez,21 
which invalidated a federal law prohibiting firearms within 1,000 feet of 
a school zone. According to the Lopez, Congress still has the power to 
regulate anything that "substantially affects" interstate commerce under 
the Commerce Clause.22 The Commerce Clause states that "The 
Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."23 
However, in Lopez, Congress' justification that gun possession in school 
zones affects interstate commerce was apparently an illegitimate exercise 
of congressional power.24 
Because Congress relied on the Commerce Clause to enact the 
interstate domestic violence and the civil rights for women laws, the 
purpose of this Comment is to explore, in light of Lopez, whether 
Congress was legitimately exercising its commerce power. Also, 
because Congress additionally relied on its power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil rights cause of action for 
victims of violence motivated by gender, this Comment asks whether 
Congress was acting appropriately to secure the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of equal protection under the law.25 
18. Id. 
19. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. 
Va. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. 
Va. 1996). See infra Part X.C for a discussion of the Brzonkala case. 
20. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). See infra Part X.B for 
a discussion of the Doe case. 
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
22. Id. at 558-59. "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate 
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. (citations omitted). 
23. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
24. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
25. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. "The Congress shall have the 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. 
amend XIV, § 5. 
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Parts I and II of this Comment discuss these statutes and their 
legislative history. Part ill examines how the interstate domestic 
violence statute fits in with the history of Congress' power to enact 
federal crimes under the Commerce Clause. Part IV examines the 
origins of Congress' power to enact civil rights legislation based on the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and how 
the civil right to be free from violence motivated by gender comports 
with that power. Part V examines United States v. Lopez and its 
implications. Part VI examines how United States v. Lopez has been 
treated in the lower courts when used to challenge the constitutionality 
of statutes concerning gun possession, carjacking, abortion clinic access, 
and child support. Parts VII and vm apply Lopez to the interstate 
domestic violence and civil rights for women statutes. Part IX concludes 
that the interstate domestic violence statute remains constitutional, but 
questions the validity of the civil rights for women statute. Part X 
summarizes recent cases involving these statutes that were decided after 
this comment was written. 
I. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT - INTERSTATE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
18 U.S.C. § 2261 makes it a crime to cross state lines and commit 
violent acts against a spouse or intimate partner.26 As such, the statute 
26. 18 u.s.c. § 2261 (1994): 
§ 2261. INTERSTATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(a) Offenses.-
(1) Crossing a State line.-A person who travels across a State line or 
enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or 
intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course 
of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence 
and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall 
be punished as provided in subsection (b ). 
(2) Causing the crossing of a State line.-A person who causes a 
spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave 
Indian country by force, coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course 
or as a result of that conduct, intentionally commits a crime of 
violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the person's spouse or 
intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b ). 
(b) Penalties.-A person who violates this section shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned-
(I) for life or any term of years, if death of the offender's spouse or 
intimate partner results; 
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itself contains the express jurisdictional requirement of crossing a state 
line, which ensures, on a case-by-case basis, a nexus with interstate 
travel. Although the statute otherwise claims no underlying authority for 
its passage, congressional hearings refer to the Commerce Clause: 
"Congress' power over interstate commerce of course allows it to 
regulate interstate crimes."27 Moreover, although congressional 
findings for the Violence Against Women Act do not contain specific 
data on how domestic violence affects interstate commerce, Senator 
Biden quoted the following statistics: 
Our society pays a heavy price for this violence: l million [women] a year seek 
medical attention for injuries caused by violence at the hand of a male partner; 
children in homes with family violence are 15 times more likely to be abused 
or neglected than children in peaceful homes; and finally, estimates suggest that 
we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and other 
social costs of domestic violence. Indeed, for the past 4 years, the U.S. 
Surgeons General have warned that family violence-not heart attacks or cancer 
or strokes-poses the single largest threat of injury to adult women in this 
country.28 
Because ''women constitute 50% of the nation's labor force,"29 there is 
certainly an inferential argument that domestic violence, in the aggregate, 
affects interstate commerce. Further, Congress could apply to the 
interstate domestic violence statute its numerous findings on gender-
based vio lence, which were used to support its jurisdictional authority 
for the civil rights remedy,30 discussed in the following section. 
(2) for not more than 20 years if permanent disfigurement or life 
threatening bodily injury to the offender's spouse or intimate partner 
results; 
(3) for not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the 
offender's spouse or intimate partner results or if the offender uses a 
dangerous weapon during the offense; 
( 4) as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109 A if the 
offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A (without 
regard to whether the offense was committed in the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison); 
and 
(5) for not more than 5 years, in any other case, or both fined and 
imprisoned. 
27. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing on H.R. 1133 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1993) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Law 
Professor, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Crimes of Violence]. 
28. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993). 
29. Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 43 (statement of Burt Neubome, Law 
Professor, New York University). 
30. See infra Part II. 
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II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT-CIVIL 
RIGHTS FOR WOMEN 
42 U.S.C. § 1398131 creates the first federal civil rights remedy for 
31. 42 u.s.c. § 13981 (1994): 
§ 13981. Civil rights 
(a) Purpose 
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as 
under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this 
part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence 
and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate 
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for 
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender. 
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence 
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from 
crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of 
this section). 
( c) Cause of action 
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a 
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the 
right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the 
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and 
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief 
as a court may deem appropriate. 
( d) Definitions 
For purposes of this section--
(I) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime 
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, 
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; 
and 
(2) the term "crime of violence" means---
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against 
the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the 
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and 
that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses 
described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or not those acts have 
actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and 
whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, 
territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and 
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony 
described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the 
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such 
action is taken. 
( e) Limitation and procedures 
( 1) Limitation 
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gender-based violent crime, allowing any victim of such crime to bring 
a civil action against her attacker in federal court for damages and other 
relief.32 In what situations can this new remedy be used? There must 
be a violent felony "motivated by gender," which is to say that a woman 
"must demonstrate that the defendant attacked her because she is a 
woman and that the attacker was motivated, at least in part, by her 
gender."33 Senator Biden cites an example of how a woman could 
show such gender-motivated violence: "[A] defendant entered a 
department store carrying a gun, picked out women in the store and shot 
her while screaming anti-women epithets, and leaving the many nearby 
men unharmed."34 However, verbal expressions of bias are not 
mandatory; the attacker may demonstrate bias by his actions alone.35 
Because the above explanation is somewhat general, perhaps it would 
be useful to explore this civil rights remedy in terms of rape, a horrible 
form of violence against women. According to Senate Report 103-138, 
"Title III does not create a general Federal law for all assaults or rapes 
against women."36 Rather, "[d]iscriminatory motivation is clearly 
required . . . and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving . . . that the 
crime of violence--whether an assault, a kidnapping, or a rape--was 
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under 
subsection ( c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated 
to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the 
meaning of subsection (d) of this section). 
(2) No prior criminal action 
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecu-
tion, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action 
under subsection ( c) of this section 
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction 
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over 
actions brought pursuant to this part. 
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction 
Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section 
shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such 
subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction 
over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, 
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody 
decree. 
32. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993). 
33. Id. at 50-51. This remedy is "intended to apply primarily against individuals;" 
it "does not permit suits against a municipality simply because the government employed 
an individual who committed a gender motivated crime;" nor does it "permit damage 
suits against a State or a State official acting in his official capacity;" nor does it "permit 
a claim on the grounds that a governmental entity has violated a citizen's due process 
rights by failing to protect him or her." Id. at 53. 
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motivated by gender."37 As far as proof requirements, "[j]udges and 
juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the circumstances' 
surrounding the event. "38 Thus to prove that rape was motivated by 
gender animus, several factors can be considered: 
Consider the case of a serial rapist who shouts misogynist slurs as he attacks 
his victims. A victim's lawyer would prove ... that the victim was of a 
particular sex; that the attacker had a long history of attacking persons of that 
sex, but not those of the opposite sex; and that the attacker shouted antiwoman 
(or man) epithets during the assault. Bias, in short, can be proven by 
circumstantial evidence as well as indirect evidence. Again, the jury might not 
be convinced by any one of these circumstances individually-but could conclude 
that, taken together, they show gender bias. 39 
In Senate Report 103-138, Senator Biden analogized this civil rights 
remedy to protect women against gender-based violence to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2OOOe, which bars gender discrimination in the workplace.40 Senator 
Biden also noted that traditional civil rights remedies against violent 
discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin, have been 
largely unavailable to victims of gender-based attacks.41 Further, "[i]n 
the past ten years, almost every state has passed laws that increase civil 
penalties, some of which also provide civil remedies for the victims of 
hate crimes, but less than a dozen cover gender bias.',42 As such, it has 
been asserted that state remedies are inadequate to protect women from 
gender-based violence.43 
Upon closer inspection of this new civil rights law, one must ask: 
"Does Congress have the Constitutional power to enact this law?" As 
stated in the statute, Congress has the affirmative power to enact this 
legislation "under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion.',44 This specific authority was included in this section "in order 
37. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993). 
38. Id. at 52. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) 
(1994). 
41. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 49. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1398l(a) (1994). 
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to make clearer the connection between [the civil rights remedy] and 
Congress' enumerated powers," to ensure that "this provision is in all 
likelihood constitutional.',45 Most of the letters and statements submit-
ted for the House Judiciary Committee's hearing on November 16, 1993 
supported Congress' power to enact this legislation.46 Generally, these 
sources found that because the cumulative effect of gender-based 
violence affects interstate commerce, Congress could pass this law based 
on its Commerce Clause authority. Furthermore, those consulted by the 
House Judiciary Committee also considered there to be a constitutional 
violation consisting of "bias or discrimination in the administration of 
the criminal justice system-in the form of a refusal to deal adequately 
with crime against women. "47 
More specifically, at the time this civil rights remedy was enacted, 
Congress viewed the Commerce Clause as "a broad grant of power 
allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on 
interstate commerce."48 As such, Congress could justifiably enact this 
remedy: 
Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, 
reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces 
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national 
economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women--from 
full [participation] in the national economy. For example, studies report that 
almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the 
aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based violence affects the 
economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain 
hours that pose a significant risk of such violence.49 
Thus, a remedy for gender-based violent crime was believed to meet the 
"modest threshold required by the Commerce Clause."50 
Next, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
considered this civil rights remedy as "appropriate" for two reasons: 
"[F]irst, it attacks gender-motivated crimes that threaten women's equal 
45. Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 57. 
46. See generally, Crimes of Violence, supra note 27. 
47. Id. at 65. 
48. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993). 
49. Id. 
The facts before the Committee-emphasizing enormous levels of sex 
related violence, and the recent increase in that form of criminality-<:ould 
reasonably justify the conclusion that the interstate market is adversely 
affected. The adverse effects might include a decrease in goods and services, 
diminished employee productivity, increased medical costs, and decreases both 
in the supply of and demand for interstate products. 
Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 61 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Law Professor, 
University of Chicago). 
50. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 54. 
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protection of the laws; second, it provides a necessary remedy to fill the 
gap and rectify the biases of existing State laws."51 Under the first 
justification, "a civil action in Federal court-by a victim of gender-
based violent crime against his or her attacker ... [is the] kind of 
private action that has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court as 
appropriate to remedy violent discrimination."52 With regard to the 
second justification: 
Under the 14th amendment, there is no clearer case of Congress's power to 
legislate than when States have failed to protect equal rights .... [I]n many 
States rape survivors must overcome barriers of proof and local prejudice that 
other crime victims need not hurdle: they bear the burden of painful and 
prejudicial attacks on their credibility that other crime victims do not shoulder; 
they may be forced to expose their private lives and intimate conduct to win a 
damage award; and finally, in some cases, they may be barred from suit 
altogether by tort immunity doctrines or marital exemptions. 53 
Thus, Congress sought to remedy a constitutional violation consisting of 
"bias or discrimination in the administration of the criminal justice 
system-in the form of a refusal to deal adequately with crimes against 
women, in part because the victims in the relevant cases are women."54 
What sort of statistics are available to show discrimination in the 
administration of state criminal justice systems? The Senate Judiciary 
Committee sent requests to State criminal justice analysis centers in all 
fifty states for data on murder, assault, kidnapping, child abuse and 
rape.55 A summary of their findings is thus: 
Ninety-eight percent of rape victims will never see their attacker apprehend-
ed, convicted, and incarcerated; 
Over half (54 percent) of all rape prosecutions result in either a dismissal or 
an acquittal; 
A rape prosecution is more than twice as likely as a murder prosecution to 
be dismissed and 30 percent more likely to be dismissed than a robbery 
prosecution; 
51. Id.at55. 
52. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641 (1966); and District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973)). For a 
discussion on the private actions sanctioned by the Supreme Court as appropriate to 
remedy violent discrimination, see infra Part IV.D. 
53. Id. 
54. Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 65. 
55. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., THE 
RESPONSE To RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 23 (Comm. Print 
1993). 
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Approximately 1 in 10 rapes reported to the police results in time served in 
prison; 1 in 100 rapes (including those that go unreported) is sentenced to more 
than 1 year in prison; 
Almost one-quarter of convicted rapists are not sentenced to prison but, 
instead, are released on probation; 
Nearly one-quarter of convicted rapists receives a sentence to a local jail -
for only 11 months (according to national estimates); 
Adding together the convicted rapists sentenced to probation and those 
sentenced to local jails, almost half of all convicted rapists are sentenced to less 
than I year behind bars. 56 
Why do the statistics show less convictions and less severe punishment 
for rape? The Staff Report offered several reasons, ranging from non-
reporting of rape, to police officers not arresting for "unfounded" rape 
charges, to prosecutors' reluctance to bring any case where the offender 
knew the victim, to jury acquittals based on stereotypical attitudes, and 
lastly to judges' discretion to impose lesser sentences.57 Other Con-
gressional reports have also included anecdotal evidence which 
demonstrate how crimes against women are treated less seriously than 
other violent crimes: 
In Georgia, a judge reported that one of his colleagues, in a case of repeated 
domestic abuse, "mocked," "humiliated," and ''ridiculed" the victim and "led 
the courtroom in laughter as the woman left ... " Subsequently, the woman 
was killed by her estranged husband. 
In Vermont, a probation officer questioned whether a 9-year-old girl was a 
"real victim," since he had heard she was a "tramp." 
In California, a judge commented at a hearing that a domestic violence 
victim "probably should have been hit." 
A Connecticut prosecutor badgered a 15-year-old: "Come on, you can tell 
me. You're probably just worried that your boyfriend got you pregnant, right? 
Isn't that why you're saying he raped you?" 
A Florida judge commented during sentencing that he felt sorry for a 
confessed rapist because his victim was such a "pathetic" woman. 
A Georgia detective investigating a rape told the victim's mother that since 
the 14-year-old said "no" only once, it might not be considered a rape. 
In Maryland, a judge stated in court that he didn't believe anything that the 
abuse victim was saying "because I don't believe that anything like this could 
happen to me. "58 
Such stories emphasize why Congress found equal protection violations 
by state criminal justice systems on the basis of the states' failure to 
adequately deal with violence against women. 
56. Id. at l. 
57. Id. at 8-12. 
58. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34 (1991) (citations omitted). 
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Ill. CRIMES AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In order to address the constitutionality of the interstate domestic 
violence statute, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of federal 
crimes based on the Commerce Clause. As a starting point, Congress 
not only has the "inherent power to establish criminal penalties for 
actions that interfere with any federal interest,"59 it can also use the 
Commerce Clause to enact general criminal laws.60 Most notably, this 
power has been used to prohibit "interstate transportation incident to 
some other crime.',61 For example, the Supreme Court upheld 
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the 
transportation of lottery tickets from one state to another;62 to prohibit 
the interstate transportation of women for prostitution purposes;63 and 
to punish the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles.64 
The federalization of criminal laws progressed in the 1930s when 
Congress enacted the Lindbergh Act65 (prohibiting the transportation of 
a kidnapped victim across state lines), the Fugitive Felon Act66 
(prohibiting interstate flight to avoid prosecution for enumerated violent 
felonies), the National Firearms Act67 (regulating the sale of guns), and 
59. JOHN E. Now AK & RONALD D. ROTIJNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 ( 4th ed. 
1991). 
Thus, Congress may establish crimes related to any action taken on federal 
lands under its property power, activities relating to interstate communications 
under the postal power, the evasion of tax statutes under the taxation power, 
or the violation of federal civil rights under the powers granted by certain 
amendments to the Constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
63. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). See also Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
64. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). 
65. Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 1201 (1994)). See also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) 
(upholding the amending Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C. 
408a, which extended "Federal jurisdiction under the act to persons who have been 
kidnapped and held, not only for reward, but for any other reason ... "). 
66. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 302, 48 Stat. 782 (1934) (current version at 18 
u.s.c. § 1073 (1994)). 
67. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26 
U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1994)). 
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the National Stolen Property Act68 (prohibiting the transportation of 
stolen property in interstate commerce). These laws changed what were 
uniquely local concerns into national ones, because crime was now 
perceived as an interstate problem beyond the power of states to 
effectively address.69 Clearly, the Supreme Court was willing to 
support federal criminal laws based on interstate transportation even 
before it adopted the more expansive view of the Commerce power in 
1937.70 
However, the scope of Congress' power remained limited to situations 
having a "nexus" to interstate commerce until Perez v. United States. 71 
In Perez, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which criminalized extortionate 
credit transactions or loan sharking.72 The Court noted: 
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. 
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress 
deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods (18 
U.S.C. §§ 2312-2315) or of persons who have been kidnapped (18 U.S.C. 
§ 120 I). Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as 
for example, the destruction ofan aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or persons or things 
in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. 
§ 659). Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is with this last category 
that we are here concerned. 73 
To explain the third category, the Court cited Wicka.rd v. Filburn for the 
proposition that: 
even if [one's] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts 
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of 
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 
"direct" or "indirect". 74 
From this, the Court concluded that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions, 
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect 
interstate commerce ... [because] there is a tie-in between local loan 
sharks and interstate crime."75 That tie-in derived from congressional 
:findings that "loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized 
68. Act of May 22, 1943, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (1934) (current version at 18 
u.s.c. § 2314 (1994)). 
69. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1144 (1995). 
70. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at 154-55. 
71. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
72. Id. 
13. Id. at 150. 
14. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). 
75. Id. at 154-55. 
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interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike 
and syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its national 
operations. "76 
This expansive view has allowed more statutes which criminalize 
activities "affecting commerce" such as arson or bombings of "any 
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce;"77 possession of any firearm or ammunition "in or affecting 
commerce" by a felon;78 carjacking of vehicles that have been "trans-
ported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce;"79 
obstruction of abortion clinics;80 and failure to pay child support.81 
Currentl'2, many federal courts are hearing Lopez challenges to these 
statutes. 2 However, the interstate domestic violence statute parallels 
the earlier criminal laws which criminalize an activity combined with 
interstate transportation, not an activity that "affects commerce" such as 
the loan sharking in Perez. As such, the Supreme Court will probably 
76. Id. at 157. 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994). See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 
(1985) (holding that rental of 2-unit apartment building is property that is "used" in an 
"activity" that affects commerce). 
78. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (1994). See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 
( 1977) (holding that proof that a possessed firearm previously traveled at some time in 
interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and 
commerce). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this statute, see infra pp. 39-40. 
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this 
statute, see infra pp. 40-41. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). Although the statute does not include the "affecting 
commerce" language, it was alluded to in the session law: 
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this legislation under 
section 8 of article I of the Constitution, as well as under section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, it is the purpose of this Act 
[enacting this section and provisions set out as notes under this section] to 
protect and promote the public safety and health and activities affecting 
interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil 
remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct 
that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain 
or provide reproductive health services. 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 
694 (1994), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 248 Historical and Statutory Notes (1996) 
(Congressional Statement of Purpose). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this 
statute, see infra pp. 41-43. 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this 
statute, see infra pp. 43-50. 
82. See infra Part VI. 
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not look favorably on a Lopez challenge to the interstate domestic 
violence statute.83 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
As stated in Part II, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 13981 pursuant to 
its power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 84 This section discusses these respective powers as well 
as whether the civil right to be free from violent crime motivated by 
gender comports with that power. 
A. Civil Rights Laws and the Commerce Clause 
The new civil rights statute in the Violence Against Women Act 
creates a civil right to be "free from crimes of violence motivated by 
gender," or in other words, violent gender discrimination.85 Congress 
believed that this law was a valid exercise of the commerce power 
because: 
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on 
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, 
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with 
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence 
motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, 
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and 
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products .... 86 
Are these the kind of substantial effects that justify the use of the 
commerce power? What are the parameters within which Congress must 
work in order to validly exercise the commerce power? 
Before 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Interstate Commerce Act87 as a precursor to modem civil rights laws. 
83. See infra Part VII for a discussion of the application of Lopez to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2261. 
84. See supra Part II. 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994). 
86. 140 CONG. REc. H8871 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) Goint explanatory statement 
of the Committee of Conference). 
87. Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act provided that: 
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this 
part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or 
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, 
locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or 
any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject 
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, 
port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular 
description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage 
in any respect whatsoever . . . . 
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In Mitchell v. United States,88 when a railroad discriminated against 
African-American passengers in giving accommodations, the Court found 
not only that the discrimination was within the "rurview of the sweeping 
prohibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act,"8 but also that Congress 
had the "authority to reach" any discriminatory action or practice of 
interstate carriers affecting interstate commerce.90 
From this, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 which 
prohibited discrimination and segregation based on race, color, religion, 
or national origin in places of public accommodation.91 The statute 
defined places of public accommodation that "affect interstate com-
merce" as establishments which "provide lodging to transient guests"; 
"facilit[ies] principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the 
premises"; "gasoline station[s]"; "place[s] of exhibition or entertain-
ment"; and any other establishments physically located on the prior 
mentioned places.92 The statute explicitly requires a nexus of either 
"interstate travelers" or products that have "moved in commerce."93 
The Civil Rights Act also defines commerce as "travel, trade, traffic, 
commerce, transportation, or communication among the several 
States."94 Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court upheld this 
law as applied to hotels in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States95 and to restaurants in Katzenbach v. McClung.96 In Heart of 
49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1940), amended by 49 U.S.C. § l074(b)-(d) (1994). 
88. 313 U.S. 80 (1941). 
89. Id. at 94. 
90. Id. See also Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding that a 
restaurant in a bus terminal violated the Interstate Commerce Act by discriminating 
against a black interstate traveler); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) 
(holding that discrimination in railroad dining accommodations violates Interstate 
Commerce Act); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (holding that a state statute 
requiring segregation of passengers in public motor carriers unlawfully burdened 
interstate commerce). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994). 
92. Id.§ 2000a(b). "[A]ny inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides 
lodging to transient guests" is automatically considered to "affect interstate commerce." 
Id. § 2000a(b)(l). The other enumerated establishments come within the purview of the 
statute when "a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other 
products which it sells, has moved in commerce." Id. § 2000a(c). It is interesting to 
note that under the subsection concerning places of exhibition or entertainment, not only 
films "move in commerce," but so do performances and athletic teams. Id. 
93. Id. § 2000a(c). 
94. Id. 
95. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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Atlanta, the Court stated that "the determinative test of the exercise of 
power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether 
the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns more 
States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national 
interest. "97 The Court cited the definition of commerce in Gibbons v. 
Ogden98 approvingly, that commerce is "intercourse,"99 and that this 
intercourse "include[s] the movement of persons through more States 
than one."100 Thus, in enacting legislation, Congress has the power to 
promote interstate commerce by regulating local activities "which might 
have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce."101 Further, 
the Heart of Atlanta Court believed that methods used to eliminate 
obstructions found in interstate commerce are: 
a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts. 
How obstructions in commerce may be removed-what means are to be 
employed-is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is 
subject only to one caveat---that the means chosen by it must be reasonably 
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. 102 
Thus, a rational basis/minimal scrutiny type review was set out for future 
Commerce Clause cases;103 even though the Civil Rights Act had no 
congressional findings on the relationship between racial discrimination 
and interstate commerce, congressional hearings provided "overwhelming 
evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate 
travel."104 
96. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
97. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 255. 
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
99. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 254. 
I 00. Id. at 255-56. The Court also quotes from Caminetti as follows: 
The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been 
settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause 
of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of 
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently 
sustained, and is no longer open to question. 
Id. at 256 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)). More 
importantly, it does not "make any difference whether the transportation is commercial 
in character." Id. 
101. Id. at 258. 
102. Id. at 261-62. 
103. See Katzenbach v. McC!ung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("But where we find 
that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis 
for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our 
investigation is at an end."). 
104. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53. 
[T]he overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimina-
tion has had on commercial intercourse . . . empowered Congress to enact 
appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, 
Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to 
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In Katzenbach v. McC/ung, ,os the Court determined that Congress 
had "a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants 
had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate com-
merce."106 Here, "Congress acted well within its power to protect and 
foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title II [ of the Civil 
Rights Act] only to those restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers 
or serving food, a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate 
commerce."107 Thus, it appeared that even if something as minimal as 
the food served came from another state, a sufficient tie to interstate 
commerce exists for Congress to exercise its regulatory power. 
As applied to the civil rights for women statute, it appears that 
Congress must have a rational basis to conclude that violent gender 
discrimination has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As such, 
it would seem rather easy to say that Congress may regulate whatever 
it chooses. But the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, was 
concerned only with the deterrence of interstate travel by racial 
discrimination in public accommodations, and was broadened in scope 
by including establishments that serve or sell products that have moved 
in interstate commerce. Here, the substantial effects on interstate 
commerce are "deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from 
engaging in employment in interstate business . . . and . . . diminishing 
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing 
the supply of and the demand for interstate products."108 
With potential victims of violent gender discrimination, there has not 
been the same kind of racial discrimination in public accommodations 
that could be legitimately viewed as deterring interstate travel. It can be 
asserted that interstate commerce is displaced because women avoid 
certain areas, especially during certain time periods like at night, and that 
this does indeed deter interstate travel. However, not only "violent 
gender discrimination," but all forms of crime strike fear in the hearts of 
women and men. Adopting this rationale would inevitably lead to 
interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and 
social wrong. 
Id. at 257. 
105. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
106. Id. at 304. 
107. Id. 
108. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (joint explanatory 
statement of the Committee of Conference). 
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federalization of all criminal law, because fear constrains all people from 
traveling to certain places at certain times. 
Next, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) makes it a federal crime for: 
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of 
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, 
intimidate or interfere with any person because of his race, color, religion or 
national origin and because he is or has been . . . applying for or enjoying 
employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency 
of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or 
advantages of any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency. 109 
On its face, this statute does not apply to interference based on gender. 
But even if it did, there is a significant distinction between someone who 
willfully interferes with "applying for or enjoying employment," 
compared with the fear that a violent crime motivated by gender will 
deter a potential victim "from engaging in employment in interstate 
business." The former contemplates an individual actor with discrimina-
tory purpose against another specific individual; the latter focuses on 
general fear deterring potential victims. 
Decreasing supply and demand of interstate products is also a great 
departure from places of public accommodation serving or selling 
products that have moved in interstate commerce. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 expanded its anti-discriminatory reach by including establish-
ments that served or sold goods that moved in commerce. Using a 
supply and demand theory to demonstrate a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce would place virtually no limit on federal power. 
Similarly, if an adequate substantial effect on interstate commerce is 
found by looking at the "effects" of an activity that is sought to be 
regulated and finding diminished national productivity and increased 
medical costs, then such a nebulous standard would allow regulation of 
almost any activity, regardless of its effect on commerce. As a result, 
when enacting the civil rights for women statute, Congress did not 
display a proper substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
B. Congressional Power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
That the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted through Congress' 
commerce power"0 was probably due to the fact that Section 5 of the 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C) (1994). 
110. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Fourteenth Amendmentm had been greatly limited by the Civil Rights 
Cases of 1883.112 However, in 1966, six members of the Court 
suggested a much broader view of Section 5 in United States v. 
Guest. 113 At issue was 18 U.S.C. § 241, which criminalized conspira-
cy to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, 
Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States."114 Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas' concurring opinion 
adopted the view that "the specific language of Section 5 empowers the 
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies---with or without state 
action--that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."115 Justices 
Brennan, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren endorsed this view as 
well.116 
111. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
112. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
[T]he last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce 
it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. 
To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited 
State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and 
innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is 
the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon 
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes 
of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It 
does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the 
regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the 
operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, 
when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the 
amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against 
State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by 
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such 
prohibition into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated 
upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the 
correction of their operation and effect. 
Id. at 11-12. 
113. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
114. 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1994). 
115. Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). 
116. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
[Section] 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to 
interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not 
state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the 
conspiracy. Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to 
established doctrine, 'speaks to the State or to those acting under the color of 
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Three months later, Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, which defined a new standard for congressional power under 
Section 5: "Correctly viewed,§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power 
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether 
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."117 "Appropriate legislation" under section 5 is defined 
by whether it "may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause, whether it is 'plainly adapted to that end' and whether 
it is not prohibited by but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the 
constitution. "'118 Applying this standard, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965119 which 
overrode the enforcement of New York's election laws requiring an 
ability to read and write English as a voting requirement.120 
Justice Harlan was highly critical of this new standard, stating that 
"[i]n effect the Court reads Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the 
Amendment."121 This sort of "legislative announcement that Congress 
believes a state law to entail an unconstitutional deprivation of equal 
protection" would abdicate the responsibility of the Supreme Court "to 
decide the fundamental issue of whether in fact the state enactment 
violates federal constitutional rights."122 In his view, federal authority, 
be it legislative or judicial, should not intrude upon the states "unless 
Id. 
Id. 
its authority,' legislation protecting rights created by that Amendment, such as 
the right to equal utilization of state facilities, need not be confined to 
punishing conspiracies in which state officers participate. Rather, § 5 
authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary 
to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress 
is thus fully empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies 
interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection. 
117. 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966). 
118. Id. 
I 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1994). That law stated in pertinent part: 
No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth 
primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any 
State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico in which the predominate classroom language of instruction was other 
than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local 
election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any 
matter in the English language. 
120. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47. 
121. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 669-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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there has been a denial by state action of Fourteenth Amendment 
limitations."123 
Unsurprisingly, these opposing views were revisited in later decisions. 
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 124 four Justices agreed with the broad view 
announced in Morgan that Congress could pass legislation to remedy 
what it deemed to be equal protection violations. 125 However, the 
other five justices had a narrower view of the enforcement power of 
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment, which established that equal 
protection legislation was subject to review by the courts. 126 The 
123. Id. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
124. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
125. "Here we are dealing with the right of Congress to 'enforce' the principles of 
equality enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment .... The manner of enforcement 
involves discretion; but that discretion is largely entrusted to the Congress, not to the 
courts." Id. at 142-43 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that '(t)he Congress shall 
have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.' 
Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in order 
to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative 
discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some 
reasonable men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers 
Congress to make its own determination on the matter. 
Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In sum, Congress had ample evidence upon which it could have based the 
conclusion that exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise 
is wholly unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have 
in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. If discrimination is unnecessary 
to promote any legitimate state interest, it is plainly unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has ample power to forbid it under s 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We would uphold section 302 of the 1970 
Amendments as a legitimate exercise of congressional power. 
Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
126. [T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never 
intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, making the 
Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superfluous. My brother Brennan's 
opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would, under the guise of insuring 
equal protection, blot out all state power, leaving the 50 States as little more 
than impotent figureheads. 
Id. at 126. 
As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited. 
Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress' power to 
enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, Congress may not 
by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power 
granted to Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power to 
govern themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated 
powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of 
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uncertainty concerning the scope of congressional power did not end 
here. 
For example, in City of Rome v. United States, 127 at issue were 
electoral changes in Rome which were found not to have a discriminato-
ry purpose, but only a discriminatory effect on African-Americans. The 
majority cited Oregon v. Mitchell for the proposition that "Congress 
could rationally have determined that these provisions [ of the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1970] were appropriate methods of attacking 
the perpetuation of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless 
of whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only in 
effect."128 However, Justice Rehnquist disagreed, stating that "Oregon 
by no means held that Congress could simply use discriminatory effect 
as a proxy for discriminatory purpose, as the Court seems to imply."129 
Rather, it is simply not "'appropriate' for Congress to attempt to prevent 
purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which a locality proves 
is not purposeful discrimination."130 
the whole Nation. Third, Congress may only 'enforce' the provisions of the 
amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation." 
Id. at 128. 
As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for 
the commands of the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress 
to disregard those commands as the Court understands them. Although 
Congress' expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage 
qualifications is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the judiciary, 
coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, this cannot 
displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether 
Congress has exceeded its powers .... I cannot agree that the Fourteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress, or the federal judiciary, to control voter 
qualifications. 
Id. at 204 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted). 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stewart's opinion. 
Stewart's view of Morgan was that Congress could impose on the States a remedy for 
the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the direct command of the 
Constitution, and that it could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact 
used as instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in an individual 
lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion. Id. at 296 (Stewart, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Congress does not have "the power 
to determine what are and what are not 'compelling state interests' for equal protection 
purposes." Id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
127. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
128. Id. at 176-77. 
129. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 214. 
To permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this 
case requires state and local governments to cede far more of their powers to 
the Federal Government than the Civil War Amendments ever envisioned; and 
it requires the judiciary to cede far more of its power to interpret and enforce 
the Constitution than ever envisioned. The intrusion is all the more offensive 
to our constitutional system when it is recognized that the only values fostered 
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Section 5 has also been invoked as a justification for many affirmative 
action programs. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, a plurality of the Court 
upheld Congress' power under section 5 to enact a statute that required 
ten percent of federal funds for local public works projects to be used 
to hire businesses owned by statutorily identified minority groups: 
"[C]ongressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful 
discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact 
perpetuating the effects of past discrimination."131 But again, dissent-
ers questioned the extent of Congress' power.132 
The question on affirmative action programs was revisited in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, where the Court held that "all racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."133 
are debatable assumptions about political theory which should properly be left 
to the local democratic process. 
Id. at 221. 
131. 448 U.S. 448, 477 (1980). Justice Powell's concurring opinion outlined the 
following test for congressional power: 
I conclude, therefore, that the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select 
reasonable remedies to advance the compelling state interest in repairing the 
effects of discrimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner 
that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. The Judicial Branch 
has the special responsibility to make a searching inquiry into the justification 
for employing a race-conscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the 
possibility that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state interest 
equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice ofa remedy should be upheld, 
however, if the means selected are equitable and reasonably necessary to the 
redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to 
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial 
review of racial classifications. 
Id. at 510 (Powell, J. concurring). 
132. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, asserted that 
[E]ven assuming that Congress has the power, under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . to remedy previous illegal racial discrimination, there is no 
evidence that Congress has in the past engaged in racial discrimination in its 
disbursement of federal contracting funds. The MBE provision thus pushes the 
limits of any such justification far beyond the equal protection standard of the 
Constitution. Certainly, nothing in the Constitution gives Congress any greater 
authority to impose detriments on the basis of race than is afforded the Judicial 
Branch. And a judicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis of race can 
be upheld only where its sole purpose is to eradicate the actual effects of 
illegal race discrimination. 
Id. at 527-28 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
133. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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In Adarand, the Court recognized the continuing divergence of views on 
Section 5: 
It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of 
the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal 
with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should 
defer to Congress' exercise of that authority .... We need not, and do not, 
address these differences today. For now, it is enough to observe that Justice 
Stevens' suggestion that any Member of this Court has repudiated in this case 
his or her previously expressed views on the subject ... is incorrect. 134 
Regardless of these differing views, the Supreme Court's action in 
Adarand "makes explicit what Justice Powell thought implicit in the 
Fullilove lead opinion: federal racial classifications, like those of a State, 
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly 
tailored to further that interest."135 
Based on the divergence of views on Congress' power under Section 
5, it becomes increasingly unclear to what extent Section 5 may be used 
to justify legislation enacted by Congress. Congress may not define the 
"substantive boundaries of the equal protection clause."136 However, 
it appears that Congress is empowered to identify what it perceives as 
equal protection violations and to enact legislation to remedy such 
violations, subject to judicial review. The remaining question is where 
the Supreme Court draws the line for its standard of review. For racial 
classifications, Adarand instructs that strict scrutiny determines that line 
when courts review legislation enacted to enforce the "equal protection 
of the laws." 
In terms of the federal civil right to be free from violence motivated 
by gender, Congress has identified an equal protection violation by the 
failure of state criminal justice systems to adequately deal with violence 
against women. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was enacted to remedy this 
violation. How are the courts to review this legislation? In Craig v. 
Boren, the Supreme Court established the rule that "[t]o withstand 
constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives."137 Thus for gender classifications, 
"intermediate" scrutiny determines how courts shall review legislation 
enacted to enforce the "equal protection of the laws."138 
134. Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted). 
135. Id. at 235. 
136. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at 913. 
137. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
138. The author is assuming that the "Violence Against Women Act" involves a 
gender classification because all of the studies in support of the civil rights statute 
involved violence against women. However, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 is gender-neutral on its 
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The question in Craig v. Boren was whether an Oklahoma statute that 
prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under age 
twenty-one and to females under age eighteen violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. 139 There, 
the important governmental objective was the "enhancement of traffic 
safety ... [or] protection of public health and safety."140 However, 
statistics used to show the substantial achievement of that objective 
revealed that only .18% of females and 2% of males aged eighteen to 
twenty-one were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. 141 
As such, the Court stated that "if maleness is to serve as a proxy for 
drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly 
tenuous 'fit. "'142 The court further revealed a distaste for utilizing 
statistical analyses to show an equal protection violation: 
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to 
be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. But this 
merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a 
dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative 
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. Suffice to say that the 
showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us that sex represents a 
legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. In fact, 
when it is further recognized that Oklahoma's statute prohibits only the selling 
of 3.2% beer to young males and not their drinking the beverage once acquired 
(even after purchase by their 18-20-year-old female companions), the 
relationship between gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy 
Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to 
achievement of the statutory objective. 143 
For the civil right to be free from violence motivated by gender, one 
could assume that protecting women against violent attack would be an 
important objective concerning public health and safety. 144 However, 
face, and therefore there is a strong argument that the analysis here should fall under 
rational relation scrutiny. 
139. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192. 
140. Id. at 199-200. 
141. Id. at 201. 
142. Id. at 201-02. 
143. Id. at 204. 
144. This assumption does not necessarily mean that the governmental objective 
here is indeed an "important" one. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982): 
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classifica-
tion is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the 
roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining 
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it becomes much more difficult to determine the "fit" of a legislative 
enactment when a particular law is not identified as gender discriminato-
ry, but rather, when entire state criminal justice systems are identified as 
violating the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
How should courts view statistics that indict entire state criminal justice 
systems, and how tight should the "fit" be? 
C. Statistics, State Criminal Justice Systems, Discriminatory 
Purpose, and the Equal Protection Clause 
The best guidance to determine that "fit" can be found in McCleskey 
v. Kemp, where a defendant convicted of murder alleged that the state's 
capital sentencing system violated the Equal Protection Clause.145 The 
defendant offered statistical evidence that purported to show a "disparity 
in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of 
the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant."146 
From this evidence, one could infer that the state acted with discrimina-
tory purpose. The Court, however, rejected this assertion by reasoning 
that 
"[d]iscriminatory purpose" ... implies more than intent as volition or intent 
as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a 
state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group. For this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove 
that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute 
because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect. 147 
Because McCleskey could not prove this, the Court refused to infer a 
discriminatory purpose by the state because "legislatures necessarily have 
wide discretion in the choice of criminal laws and penalties, and . . . 
there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and 
maintain capital punishment."148 
Four justices dissented from this decision. In Justice Blackmun's 
dissent, he stated a three-prong test for creating an inference of 
purposeful discrimination: 
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. 
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one 
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to 
be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate. 
145. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
146. Id. at 286. 
147. Id. at 298 (citations omitted). 
148. Id. at 298-99. 
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First, [a defendant] must establish that he is a member of a group "that is a 
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment." Second, he must 
make a showing of a substantial degree of differential treatment. Third, he must 
establish that the alle9edly discriminatory procedure is susceptible to abuse or 
is not racially neutral. 49 
Finding all three factors in the affirmative, Blackmun acknowledged an 
inference of discriminatory purpose, which shifted the burden to the state 
to show "that legitimate racially neutral criteria and procedures yielded 
this racially skewed result."150 In sum, only one vote separated the 
degree of scrutiny applied to statistical evidence which alleges Equal 
Protection violations by state criminal justice systems. 
For purposes of the civil rights for women statute, it appears that 
Congress would have to prove that the state legislatures enacted or 
maintained their criminal laws dealing with violence against women 
because of an anticipated gender discriminatory effect. This becomes a 
tough burden for Congress to prove if the Court refuses to otherwise 
infer discriminatory purpose by the state. Statistics showing vast 
disparities between rape prosecutions and murder and robbery prosecu-
tions, or lesser sentences for the perpetrators, do not therefore constitute 
an adequate justification for overriding state laws. Thus, if the state 
legislatures have legitimate reasons to adopt and maintain their laws 
dealing with violence against women, the federal civil remedy for 
victims of gender motivated violence fails to pass muster. However, a 
shift in the Court could change this result. 
Nevertheless, an additional consideration when determining the "fit" 
is to examine Congress' findings for a "substantial relation" to "impor-
tant governmental objectives." The federal civil remedy has been 
referred to as a way to ameliorate "hate crimes" against women. 
However, none of the statistics involved explicitly examined crimes 
motivated by gender hatred. Rather, the reports focused primarily on 
rape and domestic abuse. As such, Congress put the cart before the 
horse in assuming that these terrible forms of violence are gender 
motivated without any proof whatsoever that gender animus was 
involved in the criminal activities studied. As a result, courts may not 
find that there is a "substantial relation" or a substantial fit between 
149. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 359. 
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protecting women's health and safety and the civil right to be free from 
violence motivated by gender animus. 
D. Using Section 5 to Reach Private Action 
Yet another problem is that the civil rights for women statute reaches 
purely private action, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only 
state action. This has become clear in the way the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the civil causes of action to remedy violent racial discrimina-
tion such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Section 1983 allows anyone 
who has been deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws" to sue any person who caused that 
deprivation while acting ''under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory."151 This 
legislation was created bec;:ause of the inability of the state governments 
to control the "wave of murders and assaults . . . launched against both 
blacks and Union sympathizers."152 However, it does not reach 
"purely private conduct."153 
Section 1985 similarly grants an action for conspiracy to deprive any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, the equal 
privileges and immunities of the laws, or any right or privilege of a 
United States citizen.154 This statute does cover private conspiracies, 
but the Supreme Court has limited its applicability. For example, the 
Supreme Court has held that "Congress was wholly within its powers 
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory 
cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of 
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving 
them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men."155 It has 
also been "firmly established that the right of interstate travel is 
constitutionally protected . . . and is assertable against private as well as 
governmental interference."156 On the other hand, if a plaintiff asserts 
a violation of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights, he must prove "that 
the [ s ]tate is involved in the conspiracy, or that the aim of the conspira-
cy is to influence the activity of the [s]tate."157 
151. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994). 
152. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1973). 
153. Id. at 424. 
154. 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (1994). 
155. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). 
156. Id. 
157. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 
825, 830-3 I (1983). 
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Applying these principles to the civil rights for women statute, it 
becomes clear that Congress has enacted legislation that reaches purely 
private conduct because a victim can now sue her attacker for depriving 
her of the right to be free from violence motivated by gender. This right 
is based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet there has been 
no conspiracy between the attacker and the state, nor are gender-
motivated attackers involved in conspiracies to influence the state's 
activity. To allow this cause of action to remain constitutional, 
therefore, would circumvent the Supreme Court's holdings by character-
izing this legislation as a method of remedying constitutional violations 
by state criminal justice systems instead of as a remedy which addresses 
purely private conduct. 
V. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ 
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act,158 which 
prohibited possession of firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds. 
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth grade student, was convicted of violating 
this law. On April 15, 1995, the Supreme Court handed down a rather 
controversial holding----that this law was unconstitutional because it 
exceeded the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce 
Clause.159 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified "three 
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its 
commerce power."160 First, "Congress may regulate the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce."161 Second, "Congress is empowered 
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities."162 Third, "Congress' commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce."163 
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1994). 
159. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
160. Id. at 558. 
161. Id. "' [T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce 
free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer 
open to question."' Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,491 (1917)). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 558-59. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly disposed of the first two categories as 
irrelevant to the situation, and focused on whether gun possession in a 
school zone "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Concluding that 
it does not, the opinion states, "Section 922( q) is a criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."164 There-
fore, the statute could not be "sustained under our cases upholding 
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a 
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce."165 
The next problem was that there was no jurisdictional element in the 
statute to provide for a nexus to interstate commerce, 166 nor were there 
any "express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate 
commerce of gun possession in a school zone. "167 As such, three 
arguments were presented by the government to show that firearm 
possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce. 
First, the government stressed that gun possession leads to violent crime, 
the "costs [ of which] are substantial, and through the mechanism of 
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population."168 
Additionally, the government argued that "violent crime reduces the 
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are 
perceived to be unsafe. "169 Finally, the government stressed that 
having guns in schools "poses a substantial threat to the educational 
process by threatening the learning environment ... [a] handicapped 
educational process, in tum, [results] in a less productive citizenry ... 
[t]hat, in tum, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic 
well-being."170 
164. Id. at 561. "Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated." Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. "[Section] 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit 
its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit 
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 562. 
167. Id. 
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to 
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on 
interstate commerce . . . But to the extent that congressional findings would 
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question 
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial 
effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. 
Id. at 562-63 ( citations omitted). 
168. Id. at 563-64. 
169. Id. at 564. 
170. Id. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the first argument by noting that 
under the "costs of crime" reasoning, "Congress could regulate not only 
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, 
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."171 
Under the third argument ("national productivity"), "Congress could 
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productiv-
ity of citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child 
custody), for example."172 And although the second argument is not 
specifically addressed, Rehnquist states: "Under the theories that the 
Government presents in support of § 922( q), it is difficult to perceive 
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been sover-
eign_,,, 13 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, however, counseled "great 
restraint before the Court determines that the [Commerce] Clause is 
insufficient to support an exercise of the national power."174 Neverthe-
less, this case required appreciation of ''the significance of federalism in 
the whole structure of the Constitution."175 Kennedy agreed that the 
statute was unconstitutional because "neither the actors nor their conduct 
have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of 
the statute have an evident commercial nexus."176 Since "education is 
a traditional concern of the states", the statute intruded upon an area of 
traditional state concern. 177 Kennedy thought that the reserved powers 
of the States were sufficient to enact harsh criminal sanctions if the state 
found it necessary to deter students from carrying guns to schools. 178 
In his opinion, the statute "foreclose[ d] the States from experimenting 
and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim 
by right and history and expertise."179 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, felt that the "substantial 




174. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
175. Id. at 575. 
176. Id. at 580. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 581. 
179. Id. at 583. 
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'police power' over all aspects of American life."180 As a result, 
Thomas advocated reconsideration of that test, "with an eye toward 
constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Com-
merce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence."181 In his view, the Lopez opinion "should not be 
viewed as 'radical' or another 'wrong turn' that must be corrected in the 
future."182 Rather, Thomas suggests: 
If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a police power to 
the Federal Government, our Commerce Clause's boundaries simply cannot be 
"defined" as being "'commensurate with the national needs"' or self-consciously 
intended to let the Federal Government '"defend itself against economic forces 
that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national economy"' .... 
Such a formulation of federal power is no test at all: It is a blank check. 183 
In the principal dissent, Justice Breyer runs through three basic 
principles of Commerce Clause interpretation184 to arrive at this 
question: "[W]e must ask whether Congress could have had a rational 
basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-
related school violence and interstate commerce."185 Based on avail-
able information, it is "clear that the problem of guns in and around 
schools is widespread and extremely serious."186 Furthermore, because 
"[e]ducation ... has long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's 
economy,"187 is it not obvious that "a widespread, serious, and substan-
tial physical threat to teaching and learning also substantially threatens 
the commerce to which that teaching and learning is inextricably 
180. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
181. Id. at 585. 
182. Id. at 60 I. 
183. Id. at 602 ( citations omitted). 
184. Id. at 615-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
First, the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States," 
encompassses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly 
affect interstate commerce. . . . 
Second, in determining whether a local activity will likely have a significant 
effect upon interstate commerce, a court must consider, not the effect of an 
individual act (a single instance of gun possession), but rather the cumulative 
effect of all similar instances (i.e., the effect of all guns possessed in or near 
schools) .... 
Third . . . Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the 
existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and 
interstate commerce---both because the Constitution delegates the commerce 
power directly to Congress and because the determination requires an 
empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to 
make with accuracy. 
185. Id. at 618. 
186. Id. at 619. 
187. Id. at 620. 
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tied?"188 As a consequence, Breyer concluded that Congress could 
have had a rational basis for finding the requisite nexus between gun 
possession and interstate commerce. 
More importantly, Justice Breyer pointed out three serious legal 
problems with the majority's holding. First, the majority's holding "runs 
contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld congressional 
actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are 
less significant than the effect of school violence."189 In Perez v. 
United States, for example, the Court upheld a federal statute against 
loan sharking at a local level because Congress had found that "loan 
sharking in its national setting is one way organized crime holds its guns 
to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from 
numerous localities to finance its national operations."190 As Justice 
Breyer reasoned, the "negative impact upon the national economy of an 
inability to teach basic skills seems no smaller (nor less significant) than 
that of organized crime."191 Equally, Justice Breyer continues, in the 
cases of Katzenbach v. McClung192 and Daniel v. Paul, 193 "the Court 
understood that the specific instance of discrimination ( at a local place 
of accommodation) was part of a general practice that, considered as a 
whole, caused not only the most serious human and social harm, but had 
nationally significant economic dimensions as well."194 Moreover, 
Breyer asserts that businesses and families are less likely to move to 
areas where guns and violence plague the schools. 195 These local 
instances in tum will have "nationally significant economic dimen-
sions."196 Lastly in Wicka.rd v. Filburn, the Court upheld application 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to a farmer who grew and 
consumed wheat on his own local farm because in the aggregate, this 
188. Id. at 622-23. 
189. Id. at 625. 
190. 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971). 
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 626. 
192. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Civil Rights Act against racial discrimination 
at local restaurant). 
193. 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (finding an effect on commerce caused by an amusement 
park located several miles down a country road in the middle of Alabama because some 
customers, some food, 15 paddleboats, and a juke box had come from out of state). 
194. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 626. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 627. 
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affected interstate commerce.197 Since the Court gave Congress "the 
benefit of the doubt" in Wickard, Breyer believed the same leeway 
should be given to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 198 
The second legal problem for Justice Breyer relates to the Court's 
efforts to "reconcile its holding with earlier cases by making a critical 
distinction between 'commercial' and noncommercial 'transac-
tion[ s ]' ."199 Breyer cautions that this distinction cannot be reconciled 
"with either the civil rights cases (McClung and Daniel) or Perez. In 
each of those cases the specific transaction (the race-based exclusion, the 
use of force) was not itself 'commercial'. "200 Furthermore, the line 
between educational and commercial activities is "almost impossible do 
draw . . . [because] [ s ]chools . . . serve both social and commercial 
purposes. "201 Thus for Commerce Clause purposes, Congress could 
"consider schools as roughly analogous to commercial investments from 
which the Nation derives the benefit of an educated work force."202 
Third, the Court's holding "threatens legal uncertainty in an area of 
law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled."203 Will any 
of the statutes enacted that use the words "affecting commerce" or that 
have no jurisdictional element at all be considered to "regulate noncom-
mercial activities?"204 Whatever the result, Breyer predicts that "the 
legal uncertainty now created will restrict Congress' ability to enact 
criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that, considered problem by 
problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the 
economic, as well as social, well-being of Americans."205 
VI. SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO OTHER 
STATUTES BY LOWER COURTS 
Justice Breyer's warning about the legal uncertainty that will ensue 
from the Lopez decision has borne fruit in the myriad of cases that have 
arisen challenging the constitutionality of many Commerce Clause based 
laws. These laws range from gun possession to carjacking, and from the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act to the Child Support 
Recovery Act. 
197. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
198. Lopez, 514 U.S at 627. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 628. 
201. Id. at 629. 
202. Id. at 630. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 630-31. 
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A. Gun Possession-18 US.C. § 922(g)(J) 
The gun possession cases are brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(l) which criminalizes possession of "any firearm or ammuni-
tion which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce" by a felon.206 Three cases involving challenges to this 
statute have upheld the constitutionality of§ 922(g)(l) because, unlike 
the statute in Lopez, § 922(g)(l) contains an express jurisdictional 
element requiring that the felon's possession of the firearm or ammuni-
tion be "in or affecting commerce".207 As one court reasoned, "[i]n 
light of the Lopez Court's citation to [United States v.] Bass, it appears 
that the Lopez decision was not intended to overrule the Bass and 
Scarborough [v. United States] line of cases."208 Thus, "proof that the 
possessed firearm previously traveled at some time in interstate 
commerce [is] sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between 
possession and commerce."209 However, this statute may still be 
unconstitutional; almost all consumer goods are shipped "in interstate or 
foreign commerce," thus under this reasoning, Congress could prohibit 
the possession of almost anything. Further, there seems to be little 
reason why the federal government must have jurisdiction over felons 
possessing firearms to the exclusion of state courts. 
Id. 
206. 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(l) (1994): 
It shall be unlawful for any person---
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm 
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
207. United States v. Brown, 893 F. Supp. 11, 12 (M.D.N.C. 1995); see also United 
States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
208. Brown, 893 F. Supp. at 12. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) 
(interpreting the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) as requiring an additional nexus 
to interstate commerce); see also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 
( 1977) ( concluding that the predecessor of § 922(g)( 1) required only "the minimal nexus 
that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce."). 
209. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564. 
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B. Carjacking-18 U.S.C. § 2119 
In response to the carjacking problem, Congress passed a statute which 
criminalized carjacking of motor vehicles that have been ''transported, 
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce."210 The three 
cases that have reached the Courts of Appeals concerning this statute 
have all been resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality because 
the statute has the jurisdictional requirement that the cars must move in 
interstate commerce as well as because the statute was deemed to 
regulate an economic activity.211 Again, Congress only needed a 
rational basis for believing that the crime substantially affects interstate 
commerce.212 However, this statute may suffer from the same infirmi-
ties as the gun possession statute. Almost all products "move in 
Id. 
210. 18 u.s.c. § 2119 (1994): 
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, takes a 
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or 
foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and 
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
( 1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, 
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and 
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number 
of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death. 
211. First, carjacking is economic in a way that possession of a handgun in a 
school zone is not. When a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his or 
her car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim has suffered 
an undeniable and substantial loss. Replicated 15,000 or 20,000 times per 
year, the economic effects are indeed profound. By comparison, no matter 
how many criminals possess guns in school zones, there is no direct economic 
effect that arises from the crimes. 
Furthermore, Congress enacted the carjacking provision as one aspect of a 
national solution to a national economic problem. Every automobile theft is, 
by definition, local in its particulars, yet Congress could have rationally 
believed that it had to regulate carjacking-whether or not it was strictly 
"commercial" or "economic"-as one aspect of its comprehensive response to 
the national and international business of criminal auto theft. 
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3rd Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted). 
See also United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted): 
The carjacking statute has a very different background. First, it applies only 
to the forcible taking of a car "that has been transported, shipped, or received 
in interstate or foreign commerce" Second, cars are themselves instrumentali-
ties of commerce, which Congress may protect. Lastly, we note that Congress 
was not silent regarding the effect of carjacking on interstate commerce ... 
That Congress was addressing economic evils of an interstate nature 
differentiates the carjacking statute from the firearms statute invalidated in 
Lopez. 
See also United States v. Carolina 61 F.3d 917 (unpublished opinion) (10th Cir. 1995). 
212. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 576. 
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interstate commerce," and carjacking is more of a local crime. 
Professional auto thieves, who in their "national criminal enterprise" ship 
stolen cars across state lines, probably will not resort to the most violent 
and conspicuous form of auto theft if they wish to remain "in business." 
C. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act-18 US.C. § 248 
In response to increasing incidents of violence at abortion clinics, 
Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in 
order to "protect and promote the public safety and health and activities 
affecting interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties 
and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and 
destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with 
persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services."213 
The Act imposes civil and criminal penalties against anyone who: 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally 
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or 
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to 
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, 
obtaining or providing reproductive health services; 
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts 
to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services .... 21 
When Lopez was used to challenge the Act's constitutionality, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted: "Congress' findings are 
plausible and provide a rational basis for concluding that the Access Act 
regulates activity which 'substantially affects' interstate commerce. Thus, 
the Access Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause."215 However, a strong argument remains that this 
213. 18 u.s.c. § 248 (1994). 
214. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a). 
215. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). Before reaching this 
conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Lopez as follows: 
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Access Act does regulate 
commercial activity, the provision ofreproductive health services. Moreover, 
as the Fourth Circuit noted, extensive legislative findings support Congress' 
conclusion that the Access Act regulates activity which substantially affects 
interstate commerce. Congress found that doctors and patients often travel 
across state lines to provide and receive services, in other words, there is an 
interstate market both with respect to patients and doctors. In addition, the 
clinics receive supplies through interstate commerce. Congress further found 
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statute is unconstitutional as well because it has no jurisdictional 
requirement of crossing state lines. Further, if this statute is a valid 
exercise of power, Congress should be able to make federal laws against 
interfering with, obtaining, or providing any kind of services, although 
Congress already has passed laws against the arson or bombing of 
commercial property. 
D. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992-18 US.C. § 228 
Although Lopez caused uncertainty in the examples above, the courts 
have nevertheless resolved the issues on the side of constitutionality 
under the Commerce Clause. However, one statute has created some 
controversy in the district courts: the Child Support Recovery Act of 
1992 ("CSRA"). The CSRA punishes the willful failure to pay past due 
child support to a child who resides in another state.216 While three 
that violence, and physical obstruction of clinic entrances, threatened interstate 
commerce in the provision of reproductive health services. Id. Thus, in 
protecting the commercial activities of reproductive health providers, the 
Access Act protects and regulates commercial enterprises operating in 
interstate commerce. 
Id. at 1520 (citations omitted). 
For treatment of another federal statute dealing with extortion and abortion clinics, see 
United States v. Arena, 894 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (N.D.N.Y. 1995): 
The Hobbs Act is distinguishable from the Gun-Free School Zone Act in 
that the former expressly requires a connection to commerce. The Hobbs Act 
applies only to one who "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce" through extortion. Further, in the instant case, the government 
pleads an affect on interstate commerce. The damages to Dr. Yoffa's office 
affects interstate commerce because he treats out-of-state patients. Additional-
ly, both Planned Parenthood and Dr. Yoffa purchase goods in interstate 
commerce. Under a "depletion of assets theory," commerce is effected [sic] 
when an enterprise, which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce or 
regularly purchases items in interstate commerce, has its assets depleted 
through extortion, thereby curtailing its potential as a purchaser of such goods. 
In short, the Hobbs Act is unaffected by the ruling in Lopez, and defendant 
Wentworth's arguments that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional or inapplicable 
to the circumstances of this case are unpersuasive. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
216. 18 u.s.c. § 228 (1994): 
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(a) Offense.-Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation 
with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b ). 
(b) Punishment-The punishment for an offense under this section is-
(I) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine under this 
title, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and 
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for not 
more than 2 years, or both. 
(c) Restitution.-Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall 
order restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past due 
support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing. 
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courts have found the CSRA to be unconstitutional,217 four others have 
considered it constitutional.218 
On the side of constitutionality, the court in United States v. Sage 
found that the non-payment of child support substantially affects 
interstate commerce because "Congress considered that of the $48 billion 
in child support payments owed nationally according to court judgments, 
a total of $35 billion has never been collected. . .. Of that amount, 
interstate cases are responsible for an estimated minimum of $14 billion 
in uncollected support."219 Therefore, "the very act of withholding 
payment causes a depletion of assets that affects interstate com-
merce. "220 The non-payment "will reduce the child's consumption of 
goods in interstate commerce" as well as that of the custodial parent.221 
In addition, non-payment of all interstate support cases in the aggregate, 
"would inevitably force substantial shifts in the interstate flow of goods, 
because the total amount of interstate support owed is estimated to be 
billions of dollars. "222 
The Sage court also found persuasive the argument that non-payment 
of child support "has a substantial effect on interstate commerce in part 
because states have been unable to enforce their own support orders 
through interstate enforcement efforts."223 State measures such as the 
( d) Definitions.-As used in this section-
(1) the term "past due support obligation" means any amount -
(A) determined under a court order or an order of an administra-
tive process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a 
person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child 
and the parent with whom the child is living; and 
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, 
or is greater than $5,000 .... 
217. United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 
787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev 'd, 
United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Parker, 911 F. 
Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 
902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995). 
218. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S.Ct. 753 (1997); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995), 
vacated, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F.Supp. 389 
(S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn .. 1995), cen. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 784 (1997). 




223. Id. at 91. 
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Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act were ineffective 
because of "state boundaries and 'laws and processes that differ from 
state to state. "'224 As such, "Congress need not wait until a national 
problem reaches crisis proportions in order to act. "225 
The court in United States v. Hopper adopted a different justification: 
"that the act of collecting an obligation, though dealing with an 
intangible, does amount to commerce."226 Deriving its authority from 
United States v. Shubert,227 the court reasoned that commerce exists 
when there is a "continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among 
the states involving the transmission of large sums of money and 
communications by mail, telephone, and telegraph."228 As such, 
interstate child support payments are commerce, because "[p ]ayment of 
support results in large sums of money being transmitted, and the 
amount of child support not paid is significant. Clearly, attempts to 
collect that past due support involve the mail, telephone and tele-
graph ... 229 
Yet another court upheld the Act by acknowledging "Congress' power 
under the commerce clause to criminalize activity involving interstate 
travel."23° Citing federal criminal statutes such as fleeing a state to 
avoid prosecution or to avoid testifying,231 and willfully transporting 
an abductee across state lines,232 the court upheld the CSRA because 
"Lopez . . . itself affirmed that Congress has the authority 'to keep the 
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral or injurious 
uses. "'233 As such, "Lopez does not prohibit Congress from enacting 
laws aimed at regulating the use of interstate travel as a means by which 
to avoid the legal obligations arising from family responsibilities."234 
All of the above courts found that even though there were no words 
such as "in commerce" or "affecting commerce" in the CSRA, the 
statute did not lack a "jurisdictional element" because "the CSRA does 
explicitly require as an element of the crime that there be a willful 
224. Id. (quoting 138 CONG. REC. H7326 (1992)). 
225. Id. 
226. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
227. 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (discussing how the tenns "Trade or Commerce" are 
applied under the Shennan Act). 
228. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 
226 (1955)). 
229. Id. at 393. 
230. United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995). 
231. 18 u.s.c. § 1073 (1994). 
232. 18 u.s.c. § 1201 (1994). 
233. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995)). 
234. Id. at 617. 
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failure to provide support to a child 'who resides in another state. "'235 
As such, "[b ]y limiting regulation to interstate payments only, a nexus 
to interstate commerce is assured. "236 Therefore, these courts found 
that the CSRA did not suffer from the same infirmity as the statute in· 
Lopez. 
The other three courts differed markedly in their view of the effect of 
Lopez on the CSRA.237 In United States v. Mussari, as in Lopez, the 
court dismissed the first two categories of activity that Congress may 
regulate under the Commerce Clause as inapplicable.238 The Mussari 
court then found that the CSRA did not have a "substantial relation to 
interstate commerce" because the CSRA is a "criminal statute aimed at 
punishing parents delinquent in their child support payments"239 and 
because the CSRA is "aimed at an area of activity which has already 
been addressed by the States. "240 The interstate nexus was insufficient 
because the statute only requires that the delinquent parent live in 
another state, and allowing this to be an adequate nexus "would in 
essence give Congress carte blanche to regulate any area it deemed 
appropriate, even if such area was traditionally one regulated by the 
States, i.e. marriage, divorce, child custody, etc."241 Next, the Mussari 
court rejected the argument that Congress could enact "criminal 
legislation to redress activities which arguably affect federal monies" 
235. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995); see also 
United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1995) and Murphy, 893 F. 
Supp. at 616. 
236. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89-90. 
237. These three courts, in four cases, all found the Child Support Recovery Act 
unconstitutional: United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev 'd, 1997 
WL 99715 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995); 
United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, United 
v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996). 
238. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363. "Clearly criminalizing the failure to pay child 
support would not qualify as the regulation of the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce, nor would it qualify as the regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce." Id. 
239. Id. "[T]he CSRA is a 'criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms."' Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995)). 
240. Id. at 1364. 
241. Id. As such, "the statute is clearly not tailored to address only those parents 
who specifically flee from a state in order to avoid paying child support." Id. 
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such as the failure to pay child support.242 Finally, the court found 
that the CSRA violated the "principles of federalism and comity . . . 
[because] the areas of criminal law and child custody are traditionally 
delegated to the States for regulation."243 
In United States v. Parker, the court opined that Congress did not 
have a rational basis to conclude that the willful failure to pay child 
support is the kind of regulated activity which substantially affects 
interstate commerce.244 Borrowing from Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
court found that the CSRA "has nothing to do with commerce or any 
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms"245 because: 
Id. 
An obligation to pay child support is a debt arising from a state court divorce 
decree that is intended to benefit a custodial parent and children in the 
aftermath of a family breakup. The obligation is created when some or all of 
the members of a family as defined by state law stand before a state court 
having jurisdiction over such matters in a single state. In many child support 
cases, including this case, the noncustodial parent is required under state law 
to make the payment to the state, and the money is then forwarded by the state 
to the beneficiaries. The failure to make these payments affects primarily the 
parents and the children born of or dependent upon the marriage. Arm's-length 
242. Id. at 1365. 
243. Id. at 1367. 
Further, actual application of the CSRA would force federal courts to review 
and apply orders of state courts in violation of principles of federalism and 
comity. A defendant being prosecuted under the CSRA could arguably defend 
the action by challenging the validity of the underlying state court support 
order. Either the federal court would be forced to review the support order, 
or stay the pending federal criminal case while the support order is collaterally 
attacked in state court. Neither of these scenarios is desirable in light of the 
principles of comity and the speedy trial provisions federal courts are bound 
by in criminal matters. 
244. 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
Parker court dismissed the Government's arguments that the CSRA is constitutional as 
a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce based on the following 
analysis: 
[The CSRA] does not regulate the movement of goods or persons in 
interstate commerce. It regulates the willful failure to pay a past due child 
support obligation. The unpaid money in child support arrearage cases is not 
a "good." Even if it were, when a person is charged with the willful failure 
to pay child support, he or she is being charged with not transferring money 
across state lines. Indeed, in the circumstance where the dependent child 
moves out of state, the parent who is required to make the payment to the state 
does not get involved in an interstate transaction at all. Further, because 
[CSRA] does not regulate the shipping of goods or the movement of persons 
in interstate commerce, Darby and Heart of Atlanta Motel are inapplicable. For 
these reasons, [CSRA] does not involve the regulation of a use or channel of 
interstate commerce. 
Id. at 842-43. 
245. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
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commercial actors are not involved in any way. The marketplace for goods and 
services and prices of commodities are not affected at all. There are no affiliates 
or cohorts that comprise part of a greater economic network or enterprise. A 
citizen's ability to travel is not threatened. A willful failure to pay a court-
ordered sum, without more, involves no other crimes. The activity at issue, 
therefore, has simply nothing to do with commerce in the context of the limited 
power given to the federal government and withheld from the states in the 
Commerce Clause.246 
The court was not persuaded by the "few minimal links with interstate 
activity" such as "financial transfers across state lines, most likely 
through the mail" or extradition of the debtor or investigation of the 
debtor's whereabouts involving "out-of-state travel or cross-state 
telephone contacts" to justify the CSRA "as the sort of economic 
enterprise that substantially affects interstate commerce."247 Even 
though there was a "$5.1 billion annual deficit in child support payments 
in 1989 ... the mere fact that an activity involves billions of dollars, 
without more, is insufficient to show a substantial relationship between 
the activity and interstate commerce. . . . The focus must be on the 
activity, not the dollar figure."248 
The court rejected the government's two arguments for the substantial 
effects of not paying child support. Under the "basic necessities" theory, 
the government argued that ''the nonpayment of child support causes 
many custodial parents and their children to be unable to afford 
sufficient housing, food, medical care and other goods and services. "249 
The court responded that this theory would give Congress the power "to 
enact a criminal offense prohibiting any crime that deprives another 
person of money."250 Under the "federal subsidy theory," the govern-
246. Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted). 
247. Id. at 835. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 838. 
250. Id. 
Congress, under this scenario, could punish embezzlers, con artists, and 
muggers--even if their activity was solely intrastate-because the proceeds of 
the crimes likely would have helped the victim afford food, housing, medical 
care, or other goods and services. If the court were to follow this reasoning, 
it would be converting traditionally state-enforced, common-law crimes of theft 
into federal crimes, thus derogating the constitutionally critical "distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local." The "basic necessi-
ties" theory, therefore, is almost identical to the "national productivity" theory 
that the Lopez Court rejected and, thus, does not prove that nonpayment of 
child support has a significant effect on interstate commerce. 
1091 
ment asserted that the "nonpayment of support orders causes many 
women and children to become dependent upon welfare and other 
programs that are funded by federal money, and this substantially affects 
interstate commerce."251 The court responded that "[s]imply showing 
that an activity somehow might diminish a family's budget, thus causing 
it to request federal welfare assistance, is too attenuated a link to 
interstate commerce upon which to ground Congress's Commerce Clause 
power."252 
The Parker court continued by characterizing Wickard v. Filbum253 
"as the outer boundary of Congress's Commerce Clause power."254 
Unlike the situation in Wickard, where home grown wheat competed 
with wheat for sale in the marketplace, "the failure to pay child support 
has no effect on prices of goods and services in interstate com-
merce. "255 The Parker court distinguished United States v. Perez,256 
which upheld a statute prohibiting extortionate credit transactions, as 
follows: 
First, a person who intentionally fails to pay child support usually does so 
apart from any national enterprise or syndicate. Second, the nonpayment of 
support obligations does not affect the independence of any businesses. Third, 
unlike the facts of Perez, there is no "tie-in" between willful failures to pay a 
child support obligation and interstate crime. 257 
Lastly, the court distinguished the post-Lopez carjacking case, United 
States v. Bishop, as follows:258 
First, the noncustodial spouse who owes the money but willfully does not 
pay does not do so to generate a "profit" in the usual sense of the word. He 
or she may be keeping money that rightfully belongs to the children and comes 
out ahead in that regard, but there is no plan to secure a return on an 
investment, as the term "profit" connotes. Second, willfully avoiding a past due 
child support obligation typically is not accompanied by the commission of 
other crimes. Third, the intentional nonpayment of child support is not a 
component of a greater enterprise, network or business engaged in depriving 
custodial parents and children of payments to which they are legally enti-
tled.259 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 837. 
253. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
254. Id. (interpreting the Supreme Court's statement in Lopez, that Wickard is 
"perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate 
activity." 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)). 
255. Id. at 840. 
256. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
257. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 840. 
258. 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995). 
259. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 841. 
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Instead, the court found that the challenge to the CSRA resembled that 
in Lopez because "[n]either the possession of a handgun nor the willful 
failure to pay child support involve 'enterprises' that deal in interstate 
commerce."260 These courts, which held the CSRA unconstitutional, 
appear more consistent with the Lopez decision. 
VII. APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO 18 U.S.C. § 2261-INTERSTATE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Based on Lopez and its subsequent treatment in the lower courts, does 
the new interstate domestic violence crime remain constitutional? First 
one must ask whether crossing a state line, or causing a spouse to cross 
a state line, and committing a crime of violence which injures a spouse 
or intimate partner is a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce. Under firmly established principles, one could say that 
"[c]ommerce among the states ... consists of intercourse and traffic 
between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and 
property. There may be, therefore, a movement of persons as well as of 
property; that is, a person may move or be moved in interstate com-
merce. "261 As such, "Congress has power over transportation 'among 
the several states' . . . the power is complete in itself, and . . . Congress, 
as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient 
to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regula-
tions."262 This analysis supports the constitutionality of the interstate 
260. Id. 
261. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). 
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and nation having 
different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said; but it must be kept in mind 
that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those 
conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or 
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral. This is the 
effect of the decisions; and surely, if the facility of interstate transportation can 
be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene 
literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and 
drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to 
and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more 
insistently, of girls. 
Id. at 322. 
262. Id. at 323. 
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domestic violence crime considering its regulation of persons moving or 
being moved in interstate commerce. 
This conclusion appears to be consistent with the Lopez Court's 
apparent approval of the statement that "the authority of Congress to 
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and 
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to 
question."263 Further, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, unlike the statute in Lopez, 
does contain an express jurisdictional element which will limit its reach 
to violent crimes that "additionally have an explicit connection with or 
effect on interstate commerce."264 As such, crossing a state line to 
commit domestic violence is comparable to the post-Lopez gun 
possession cases265 where the constitutionality of the statute was 
upheld because of the requirement that the gun be possessed "in or 
affecting commerce," and "proof that the possessed firearm previously 
traveled at some time in interstate commerce [is] sufficient to satisfy the 
statutorily required nexus between possession and commerce."266 18 
U.S.C. § 2261 is also comparable to the post-Lopez carjacking cases, 
which found a sufficient nexus due to the requirement that the vehicles 
be transported, shipped, or received in interstate commerce.267 The 
difference that 18 U.S.C. Section 2261 regulates persons' actions while 
traveling interstate, whereas these other two areas regulate things that 
have traveled at some point in interstate commerce, makes the argument 
even stronger that the interstate domestic violence statute is constitution-
al. 
However, if courts read Lopez as requiring some sort of "commercial 
transaction" or "economic activity," § 2261 may indeed be unconstitu-
tional. If courts reason that cases upholding regulations dealt with 
commercial transactions such as transporting women across state lines 
for immoral purposes (prostitution) or such as kidnapping (ransom), then 
courts may find that § 2261 does not propose a commercial transaction 
such as these, and therefore, the idea that "[n]or does it make any 
difference whether the transportation is commercial in character"268 
was implicitly overruled in Lopez. This reasoning would be faulty, 
though, because the Supreme Court has already recognized that "women 
263. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995) (quoting Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)). 
264. Id. at 562. 
265. See supra pp. 39-40. 
266. United States v. Brown, 893 F. Supp. 11, 12 (M.D.N.C. 1995). 
267. See supra pp. 40-41. 
268. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citing 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1917)). 
1094 
[VOL. 34: 1047, 1997] Violence Against Women 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
are not articles of merchandise,"269 and it has upheld amendments to 
the Federal Kidnapping Act which extended "Federal jurisdiction under 
the act to persons who have been kidnapped and held, not only for 
reward, but for any other reason. ,mo 
The next question is whether § 2261 is a regulation of the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce.271 The case law which supports this 
category of activity focuses on vehicles used in commerce such as 
trains272 and planes.273 Here, the carjacking cases lend some support 
because to cross a state line, a spouse abuser will probably use some 
form of motorized transportation. The carjacking statute criminalizes a 
forceful taking of a car that has been "transported, shipped, or received" 
in commerce, while possessing a firearm.274 There, an activity was 
criminalized, and Congress was justified to enact this measure because 
of a car moving "in commerce" at some point in time. Here, Congress 
has criminalized domestic abuse, and could probably do so based on the 
fact that the abuser will accomplish this by using a vehicle that has 
moved in commerce. However, the concern remains that Congress, in 
passing the carjacking statute, was responding to the "national and 
international business of auto theft" which implicates commerce.275 
Finally, if a court were to conclude that § 2261 is not a regulation of 
the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, does the 
regulated activity of interstate domestic violence substantially affect 
interstate commerce? As stated previously,276 "estimates suggest that 
we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and 
other social costs of domestic violence."277 Thus, it could be argued, 
269. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913). 
270. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). 
271. The second test, as written in Lopez, states that "Congress is empowered to 
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." 
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). For purposes here, the author has 
analyzed "persons or things in interstate commerce" under the channels of interstate 
commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 255-64. 
272. See Southern R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (191 I) (upholding 
application of Safety Appliance Act to railroad cars). 
273. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) ("[A]s for example, the 
destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32)."). 
274. 18 u.s.c. § 2119 (1994). 
275. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
277. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993). 
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like in Lopez, that the costs of domestic violence "are substantial, and, 
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout 
the population."278 Unfortunately, this argument was rejected by the 
Lopez majority: "The Government admits, under its 'costs of crime' 
reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but 
all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how 
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."279 As a result, this 
statute might be viewed as "a criminal statute that by its terms has 
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms."280 
The post-Lopez cases in the lower courts that have upheld carjacking 
and gun possession statutes can be distinguished from the interstate 
domestic violence statute because the cars and guns have been bought 
and sold at some point in time; therefore these activities affect economic 
activity whereas domestic abuse does not. Expanding further on this 
economic activity distinction, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances 
Act regulates a "commercial activity, the provision of reproductive 
health services."281 Several factors show the substantial effect on 
interstate commerce: an interstate market of doctors and patients 
traveling across state lines to give and receive services; clinics' receiving 
supplies through interstate commerce; and violence and physical 
obstruction of clinic entrances threatening the administration of health 
services.282 Again, there exists an economic activity with a health 
clinic that is not present with interstate domestic violence. 
The only post-Lopez cases that place less emphasis on the economic 
activity requirement were those that found the Child Support Recovery 
Act constitutional.283 While one court stated that interstate child 
support payments are commerce,284 others either acknowledged 
"Congress' power under the commerce clause to criminalize activity 
involving interstate travel,"285 or found that nonpayment of support 
causes a "depletion of assets" that reduces "the child's consumption of 
goods in interstate commerce."286 As such, these recent CSRA cases 
provide the strongest support for the interstate domestic violence statute 
278. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 561. 
281. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). 
282. Id. 
283. See supra pp. 44-46. 
284. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
285. United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614,616 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated, 934 
F. Supp. 736 (1996). 
286. United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 90 (1995). 
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under the third prong, but travel is closer to the channels of interstate 
commerce prong, and the "depletion of assets" theory seems too tenuous 
to support the substantial effects test. 
In sum, the interstate domestic violence statute does not suffer from 
any lack of a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the [ domestic violence] in question affects interstate 
commerce."287 Because it applies only to domestic violence which 
occurs by crossing a state line, it should pass constitutional muster if the 
statute is considered to be a valid regulation of the channels of interstate 
commerce, and if there is no rigid requirement that the regulated activity 
be commercial in character. Requiring the activity to be commercial in 
character would invalidate many federal crimes relating to crossing state 
lines, which does not seem to be the intent of the Lopez Court. 
VIII. APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO 42 U.S.C. § 13981 
(CIVIL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN) 
As stated previously, this statute creates a civil action for victims of 
crimes of violence motivated by gender.288 However, the statute 
imposes no requirement of crossing state lines; thus, the statute cannot 
be considered a regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce. This statute cannot be compared to guns or cars 
that are moved in interstate commerce. Rather, this statute speaks to 
"activities affecting interstate commerce."289 As such, it invites 
comparisons to Lopez, and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances 
Act. The Congressional Record noted that: 
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on 
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, 
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with 
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence 
motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, 
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and 
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products. 290 
287. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
288. See supra Part II. 
289. 42 U.S.C. § l3981(a) (1994). 
290. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the 
Committee of Conference). 
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This justification bears strong resemblance to the argument advanced in 
Lopez, that "the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to 
the educational process by threatening the learning environment. "291 
Here, violence motivated by gender poses a threat to potential victims 
by deterring interstate travel, employment in interstate business, and 
transactions with businesses involved in interstate commerce. In Lopez, 
"a handicapped educational process . . . result[ s] in a less productive 
citizenry .... [which] in turn, [has] an adverse effect on the nation's 
well-being."292 Here, the adverse effect on travel, employment, and 
business will diminish national productivity, increase medical and other 
costs, and decrease the supply and demand for interstate products. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Lopez rejects this 
justification, because ''under the Government's 'national productivity' 
reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related 
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: familr law (including 
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example." 93 Under this 
theory, not only would it be "difficult to perceive any limitation on 
federal power,"294 but "[t]o uphold the Government's contentions here, 
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would 
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause 
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."295 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejects the argument that violent crime 
affects the national economy by imposing substantial costs which are 
spread throughout society.296 Under this reasoning, "Congress could 
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to 
violent crime, no matter how tenuously they relate to interstate 
commerce."297 As applied to 42 U.S.C. § 13981, it would mean that 
Congress could regulate all activities which may increase "medical and 
other costs, and decreas[ e] the supply and demand for interstate 
products,"298 no matter how tenuously those activities relate to inter-
state commerce. 
Considering that the bases on which Congress found that gender-
motivated violence affects interstate commerce mirror those argued in 




295. Id. at 567. 
296. Id. at 563-64. 
297. Id. at 564. 
298. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the 
Committee of Conference). 
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Lopez, it is fair to say that Rehnquist's majority would also find 42 
U.S.C. § 13981 unconstitutional. However, first it is necessary to 
distinguish the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("The 
Act").299 
On its face, the Act has striking similarities with 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 
Both establish civil remedies against violent conduct, and neither have 
any express jurisdictional element such as crossing a state line. But to 
reiterate, several factors show the substantial effect of clinic violence on 
interstate commerce: an interstate market of doctors and patients 
traveling across state lines to give and receive services; clinics' receiving 
supplies through interstate commerce; and violence and physical 
obstruction of clinic entrances threatening the provision of health 
services.300 42 U.S.C. § 13981 does not have the benefit of a close link 
with commercial service or medical supplies. Rather, the links are 
distant: violence motivated by gender will deter ''fo?tential victims from 
engaging in employment in interstate business" 01 instead of actually 
preventing provision of services; it will decrease "the supply of and the 
demand for interstate products"302 instead of actually affecting specific 
supplies needed to operate a clinic. As such, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 
presents another opportunity for the Court to deny the expansion of 
commerce clause jurisprudence. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Justice Breyer was correct in saying that the Lopez Court's holding 
"threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed 
reasonably well settled."303 However well-settled the law may have 
been, Commerce Clause jurisprudence was problematic and confusing 
because the original meaning of the Commerce Clause had become 
terribly diluted; Congress could pass any law provided it had a rational 
basis to find a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. It requires 
a great leap of faith to convert the phrase "The Congress shall have 
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
299. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994). 
300. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). 
301. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the 
Committee of Conference). 
302. Id. 
303. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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several States"304 to Congress shall have the power to create civil 
rights actions for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender 
because there is a "substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by 
deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in 
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, 
and in places involved, in interstate commerce."305 As such, it is 
unsurprising that Justice Thomas advocated reconsideration of the 
substantial effects test in a future case.306 
The point of this conclusion is not to say that Congress should not 
have the authority to pass laws such as the gender motivated violence 
statute. Rather, if the American people decide that Congress should 
have a general police power, let it be through Constitutional amendment, 
and not through verbal contortions of the Commerce Clause. 
Violence against women is a despicable, disheartening, and unfortu-
nately, fairly common phenomenon. It is only natural for legislators to 
want to do something to prevent its occurrence. However, tenuous links 
to the Commerce Clause are inadequate to justify creating civil rights 
remedies for violence motivated by gender animus. If such laws are 
indeed constitutional, then "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on 
federal power."307 
Senator Biden said that "none of the proposals in the (Violence 
Against Women Act], alone or together, are likely to end violence 
against women. The legislation is, however, a first step in developing 
a national consensus that society will not tolerate such violence."308 
It seems to the author that a national consensus is hardly furthered by 
enacting a civil rights remedy that requires something such as "a 
defendant entered a department store carrying a gun, picked out women 
in the store and shot her while screamin§i anti-women epithets, and 
leaving the many nearby men unharmed."3 It is better served by the 
other elements of the Violence Against Women Act which provide 
criminal penalties for crossing state lines to commit domestic violence, 
funding for counseling and domestic abuse shelters, and education on the 
biases women face on domestic matters in the courts. 
304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
305. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the 
Committee of Conference). 
306. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
307. Id. at 564. 
308. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 138 (1993). 
309. Id. at 51. 
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X. RECENT CASES INVOLVING 18 U.S.C. § 2261 & 
42 u.s.c. § 13981 
After this comment was written, three challenges to the constitutional-
ity of the above statutes were decided, one involving the interstate 
domestic violence statute, the other two involving the civil right to be 
free from violence motivated by gender statute. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the Brzonkala case which was instituted in 1995 is one of 
these decisions. The constitutionality of the interstate domestic violence 
statute was upheld, while the other two district courts were split on the 
constitutionality of the civil rights statute. This part will briefly 
summarize the main arguments and holdings of those cases. 
A. United States v. Gluzman & 18 US.C. § 2261 
In United States v. Gluzman, a woman was charged with conspiring 
to commit interstate domestic violence and for committing interstate 
domestic violence.310 Specifically, the indictment charged that Rita 
Gluzman "conspired to, and actually did, travel from New Jersey to New 
York with the intent to murder her estranged husband, and that, once in 
New York, she murdered him, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261."311 
Relying on Lopez, Gluzman subsequently brought a motion to dismiss 
her indictment "arguing that section 2261 neither regulates a commercial 
activity nor contains a requirement that the activity in question be 
connected to interstate commerce, and therefore its enactment exceeded 
the authority of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause."312 
Gluzman argued that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2261 did not 
support Congress' authority to enact the statute under the Commerce 
Clause, and "that Congress is limited, under its Commerce powers, to 
regulating only those activities that have an economic component or that 
implicate some other attribute of commerce."313 
The court disagreed with Gluzman, finding that "Congress had a 
rational basis for concluding that the regulation of interstate domestic 
violence was 'reasonably adapted to [an] end permitted by the Constitu-
310. United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 




tion. "'314 The court did not think that the statute was subject to the 
analysis in Lopez under the "substantially affects interstate commerce" 
language: 
Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, section 2261 does not regulate purely 
local activity, but, instead, is an exercise of Congress' power under the first 
category of cases articulated by the Lopez Court------the authority to regulate the 
use of channels of commerce. Furthermore, the section clearly requires an 
identifiable interstate nexus, namely, the crossing of a state line with the 
criminal intent to commit domestic violence against one's spouse and the actual 
commission of such violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 226l(a). Section 2261 therefore 
avoids the constitutional deficiencies identified in Lopez where the interstate 
nexus was non-existent and the activity to be regulated was purely local. Thus, 
whatever limitation Lopez may have recognized with respect to congressional 
power over intrastate activities that may affect commerce, the decision did not 
speak to the broad power of Congress to regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce, an area occupied by section 2261 as well as numerous other 
criminal statutes.315 
Thus the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 2261 was a constitutional exercise 
of Congress' power to regulate commerce.316 
B. Doe v. Doe & 42 US.C. § 13981 
In Doe v. Doe, a wife sought damages for deprivation of her federal 
right to be free from her husband's alleged gender-based violence against 
her.317 She alleged "that from 1978 until 1995 [her husband] 'system-
atically and continuously inflicted a violent pattern of physical and 
mental abuse and cruelty upon [her],' including throwing her to the 
floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and dangerous objects at her, 
threatening to kill her, and destroying property belonging to [her]."318 
She also alleged that her husband forced her "to be a 'slave' and 
perform all manual labor, including maintaining and laying out his 
clothes for his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and mistress-
es. "319 
Her husband filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the constitutional-
ity of the civil rights remedy provision of the VAWA, and "claiming 
that Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to enact this 
statutory scheme recognizing and enforcing a federal civil right to be 
314. Id. at 88 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 
452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). 
315. Id.at89. 
316. Id. at 92. 
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free from gender-based violence."320 The husband argued that Lopez 
overruled the rationality test for determining whether federal regulation 
of interstate conduct can be sustained, and that Congress exceeded its 
authority in enacting the VAWA because Lopez was critical of the same 
arguments relied on in enacting the VAWA, namely the Government's 
"cost of crime" and "national productivity" reasoning.321 
The court disagreed with the husband, stating that Lopez reaffirmed 
the rationality test of Hodel, and that "[t]he Congressional findings and 
reports qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate the substantial effect 
on interstate commerce of gender-based violence, in marked distinction 
to the Gun Free Zone Act challenged in Lopez which lacked such 
analysis, only theoretical impact arguments."322 The court rejected the 
husband's arguments based on the "cost of crime" and "national 
productivity" rationales which were rejected in Lopez, believing the 
husband's arguments were "based upon 'selectively relying on Supreme 
Court statements plucked from their context. "'323 As such, the court 
believed that: 
Given the important nature of the conduct sought to be prevented and the 
previously-approved private attorney general method of remedy, this court 
concludes that the statutory scheme which creates a federal civil rights remedy 
for gender-motivated violence is reasonably adapted to an end permitted by the 
Constitution. This conclusion is consistent with prior precedent related to other 
federal civil rights remedies enacted by Congress and upheld by courts as 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 324 
The court thus found that the VAWA was a permissible constitutional 
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and it 
reached this result without considering whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also authorized Congress to enact the VAWA. 325 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 613. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. (citing U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (11th Cir.1995)). 
324. Id. at 617 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 under the Commerce Clause); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 
243 (1983) (upholding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under the Commerce 
Clause); Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Fair 
Housing Act); Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593-95 (D. Me. 1995) (Americans 
with Disabilities Act)). 
325. Id. 
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C. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University & 42 
u.s.c. § 13981 
The court in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University26 
went into considerably more detail in analyzing the constitutionality of 
the civil rights statute. First, it analyzed the facts of the case in order to 
determine whether the rape was motivated by gender animus. The court 
found that there were enough factors surrounding the rape indicative of 
gender animus; thus a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was 
defeated.327 However, the court closely examined Congress' power 
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was unconstitutional. 
Under the Commerce Clause, the court stated that the statute must 
regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, 
as in Lopez. The court broke down the Lopez analysis into four parts: 
the nature of the regulated activity; an individual case inquiry; the 
relevance of legislative history; and the practical implications of 
accepting the government's argument that the economic impact of the 
regulated activity had sufficient effects on interstate commerce to sustain 
the regulation. 328 After examining these four parts, the court then 
compared Lopez and found that "[t]he combination of the insignificance 
of the differences between the case at hand and Lopez and the signifi-
cance of the similarities leads to the conclusion that Congress acted 
beyond its commerce power in enacting VAWA."329 
The court then focused on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and on Congress' "two ends in mind in drafting VAWA: 
(1) to remedy private individuals' gender-based violence and (2) to 
326. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). 
327. Id. at 784-85. 
328. Id. at 786-87. 
329. Id. at 793. 
Arguably the following three differences between the case at hand and Lopez 
render Lopez's logic inapplicable to the case at hand: (1) that VAWA is civil, 
and the Lopez statute was criminal, (2) that there are legislative findings here 
but not in Lopez, and (3) that fewer steps of causation exist between the 
VAWA regulated activity and commerce than§ 922(q)'s regulated activity and 
commerce. The similarities include (1) the criminal nature of both statutes, (2) 
the non-commercial nature of both statutes, (3) the lack of a jurisdictional 
requirement that some effect on interstate commerce is involved in each case, 
(4) the remoteness of any effect on commerce, and (5) the excessive 
congressional power that would logically follow from permitting both statutes 
based on the Commerce Clause. 
Id. at 789. 
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remedy gender-based deficiencies in the states' criminal justice 
systems."330 The court examined both ends and found neither of them 
to be legitimate,331 concluding that: 
No reasonable possibility exists that, in enacting VAWA, Congress has enforced 
the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." No reasonable 
possibility exists that VAWA will remedy any legitimate Fourteenth Amend-
ment concern. 332 
The court acknowledged that "violence against women is a pervasive and 
troublesome aspect of American life which needs thoughtful atten-
tion. "333 However, "Congress is not invested with the authority to cure 
all of the ills of mankind. Its authority to act is limited by the 
Constitution, and the constitutional limits must be respected if our 
federal system is to survive."334 
DEREK A. KURTZ 
330. Id. at 797. 
331. Id. at 797-801. 
332. Id. at 801. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
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